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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution and its various 
amendments guarantee basic rights and freedoms which are 
intrinsically related to the functioning of a true democracy. 
The right to vote and the freedom of association can be per­
ceived as forming the pillar of our participatory political 
system. However, as with many rights, they do not exist in 
a vacuum and may not be absolute in nature. For instance, 
one would certainly not argue that the abstract right to 
vote translates into a system of public referenda on each 
and every issue that confronts our society. This pure model 
of democracy is surely impracticable in our world. Thus, we 
have opted for a representative democracy in which citizens 
vote for officials to whom they delegate their decision­
making power on policies, funding, and mundane governmental 
administrative duties. By this simple example, we see how 
such an abstract right may begin to be limited and put into 
real practice.
Similarly, the freedom of association guaranteed by 
the First Amendment has been interpreted by the courts to 
help us understand its meaning in our changing society.
This freedom is related in many aspects to free speech and 
free exercise of religion, but I would like to address the 
issue of freedom of association from a slightly different
1
2angle. The interplay of the freedom of association and the 
right to vote synthesizes for us an issue in partisan pri­
mary elections.
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 35? U.S. 449 
(1958), the court gave the first full enunciation of the 
constitutional right to freedom of association.^ Since then, 
this First Amendment freedom has been repeatedly interpreted 
as permitting political parties to organize like-minded mem­
bers, determine the content of their messages, and to pursue 
political objectives. An integral part of a party's politi­
cal objectives is to elect candidates to government positions.
As one stage in this candidate selection process, the
direct primary was introduced around the turn of the century
by Robert M. La Follette, "one of progressivism's high 
2priests." By 1955, all the states had incorporated a pri­
mary scheme for nominating candidates. The primary was first 
seen as an alternative to the often corrupt, party boss, 
bunch-of-the-guys-in-the-back-of-the-room method of nominating 
candidates for public office. Sorauf explained the ideological 
movement which carried the primary system to national promi­
nence i " . . .  the primary triumphed on the belief that in a 
democracy, the greatest possible number of party members 
ought to take part in the nomination of the party's candi-
3dates." Thus, the primary was initiated as a reform to 
help open up the candidate selection process.
Given today's varied primary systems across the 
country, one sometimes wonders to what degree the primary
i* trul* ah internal patty anlection process of Simply an 
institution of the state's electoral structure. it it at 
this juncture where the freedom of association of political 
parties and their members may be juxtaposed with each eiti- 
sen'a right to vote and the state's interest in regulating 
elections. One may question whether the right to vote 
includes voting in primary elections. For if the primary 
is merely an internal partisan process, mandatory inclusion 
of outsiders may impinge on the party's freedom of associa­
tion. Julia Guttman has explained thati "The Constitution 
makes no explicit provision for statutory regulation of 
primaries. Direct applicability of the Constitution to 
primary elections remained uncertain until Ninon v. Herndon.
. . . The courts have yet to hammer out all the contours of 
the Constitution's applicability to p r i m a r i e s . t h e  added 
thati "The Court's invocation of the Fifteenth Amendment 
and the one person, one vote standard in . . . cases involv­
ing primary elections does suggest that participation in a 
primary is part of the right to vote. E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963) t Smith v. Allwrlcht. 321 U.S. 64(9 
(1944)."5 These issues are all implicated under the question 
of whether a party or the state has the power to restrict or 
open up voting in a primary in the interests of freedom of 
association.
These questions and ethers have been addressed by 
the United States Supreme Court recently in its examination
I
of the constitutionality of a state aiaction code with regard 
to an individual's right to vota and hath tha individual and 
tha eollactiva freedoms of association, This case, Tashlian
v^ ftepufalloan PatW of Connecticut. __u.s. _  urn), has
sparkad my inquiry aa to tha natura of state election codas 
and how thuy would be treated by the courts in light of 
the tashlian case. A question to be addressed is whether it 
is the state or tha party who actually has the power to 
define tha primary electorate.
What follows is first an overall background and 
analysis of the facts and issues present in the Connecticut 
case. Second, the election codes of the fifty states will 
be surveyed and categorized, outlining distinctive elements 
of certain primary systems. Finally, I will venture a 
diagnosis of which statutes may be susceptible to a chal­
lenge similar to Connecticut's and thus consider the impli­
cations of Tashlian for the states' primary election statutes. 
This analysis is not meant to provide a definitive explana­
tion of the evolution or the right to vote or political 
association under the Supreme Court through the ages. The 
es^hasis is on the categorical framework of the fifty state 
prisiary election codes I develop and the implications of the 
Tashlian case of this framework.
4
5II. TASHJIAN V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CONNECTICUT
Connecticut'8 closed primary statute section 9-431, 
which stated that: "No person shall be permitted to vote at
a primary of a party unless he is on the last-completed 
enrollment list of such party. . . . "  was challenged by the 
state Republican party in Tashjian v. Republican Party of
CConnecticut, ___ U.S. ___ (1986). The closed primary system
was adopted by Connecticut in 1955 and until 1984, was gen­
erally supported. In 1984, due to changing political demo­
graphic reasons, the Republican party adopted a party rule 
that would also allow previously unaffiliated voters to 
participate in that party's primary election. The rationale 
behind this move was partially attributable to the fact that 
the party wanted to nominate more moderate candidates who 
would be more electable at the upcoming November general 
election. At the same time, there was an attempt to change 
the statute in the state legislature. The attempt failed, 
but the Republicans did receive a concession.
This concession was that section 9-56 was amended to 
allow previously unaffiliated voters to enroll as party mem­
bers as late as just before noon on the last business day 
prior to the primary election and still be eligible to vote 
the ballot of that party ac the primary. The prior law had 
allowed previously unaffiliated voters to enroll in a 
political party no later than the 14th day preceding the 
primary. However, if a voter desired to actually change
6affiliation from one party to another, he must change no 
lator than six months prior to the election in order to vote 
the party's ballot at the primary (Conn, section 9-59).
Thus, the likelihood of Democrats being able to cross over 
and vote the ballot of the Republicans (or vice versa) was 
still severely circumscribed, but the potential for inde­
pendents to affiliate just before the primary was enhanced.
The Republican Party of Connecticut was not appeased 
by this concession and took its case to the federal courts, 
arguing that section 9-431: " . . .  deprives the Party of
its First Amendment right to enter into political association 
with individuals of its own choosing."8 The District Court 
and the 2nd Court of Appeals found the statute to be uncon­
stitutional. In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme 
Court held: "Section 9-431 impermissibly burdens the rights
of the Party and its members protected by the First and
gFourteenth Amendments."
The opinion, written by Marshall, with Brennan, White, 
Blackmun, and Powell joining, basically is organized into 
three sections. The first part deals with the nature of 
political association: past cases and their applicability
to the Tashjian case at hand. This section addresses the 
issue of whether or not there has been an infringement of 
the Party's rights. The second part explores possible state 
interests which could counterbalance an infringement. In 
this way, the Court employs a form of a balancing test to
7see which interests prevail. The third section explores 
whether the Party rule would violate the Constitution's 
Qualifications Clause because of resultant asymmetry between 
the federal and state electorates. For the purposes of this 
analysis, the first two sections of the opinion warrant the 
most interest. The third section, while an important issue 
in this case, has minimal implications for the analysis of 
current primary schemes as a whole.
A. Were protected rights of the Republican party violated?
First of all, it may be beneficial to have a concep­
tual framework with which to classify challenges to a state 
election code. Using this framework, we may follow the 
Court's logic in this case more readily.
In an article in the Yale Law Journal, Julia E. 
Guttman presents a workable framework for such an analysis. 
The Court does not explicitly use this framework but it is 
apparent that similar logical steps are followed. Thus, T 
will adopt Guttman's framework while analyzing the Court's 
opinion in the Tashjian case.
Guttman began by noting that and court-enunciated 
doctrine in this area must resolve three categories of 
challenges:
1. an independent voter challenges a state-mandated 
closed primary
2. a political party challenges a state-mandated open 
primary (claiming a right to exclude)
3. a political party challenges a state-mandated 
closed primary (claiming a right to include)*®
In ths following explanation of the Court's logic and tho 
background of cases in this field, I will repeatedly refer 
back to these type 1, 2, and 3 challenges.
As the Court discussed in its Taihjian opinion, 
challenges falling into the above type 1 category have 
usually failed. The Court uses merely a "minimal scrutiny 
test to uphold" a closed primary statute being challenged by 
an independent voter. 1 The case of Nader v. Schaffer.
417 F. Supp. 837 (Conn.), summarily aff'd, 429 U.S. 989 
(1976), challenged the very same Connecticut statute in 
1976. At that time, the Republican party supported the 
closed primary system in Connecticut and wished to keep Nader, 
an independent voter, from participating in its primary. In 
the Nader case, the statute (section 9-431) was upheld.
Guttman has explained thats "Denying an individual the 
opportunity to vote for a candidate in a primary does not
12infringe this individual right of 'freedom of association.'" 
She has addedt "The party members' constitutional right 
takes precedence over unaffiliated voters' non-constitutional 
interests in primary outcomes."13
In a footnote to the Taah jIan opinion, Marshall 
echoes this sentiment, stating that the nonmembers' claim to 
participate are outweighed by the party's right to set quali­
fications for its own members. 4 Therefore, we can conclude 
that independent voters' challenges to state-mandated closed 
primary systems would usually fail due to the fact that the
9party has an associational right to exclude and set qualifi­
cations for membership. An important facet of this category 
of cases is that the challenge is by an independent voter 
without the support of the party. Already, we can see that 
the Court exhibits some degree of deference to the party to 
regulate its internal affairs.
Let us move now to the consideration of type 2 chal­
lenges: a political party's challenge to a state-mandated
open primary system. In these cases, the party claims that 
its associational rights to set its own qualifications for 
membership should govern and allow it to exclude. An illus­
trative case for such type 2 challenges is Democratic Party 
of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 
U.S. 107 (1981).
In this Democratic Party case, the party rejected 
state prescribed stipulations for its delegates to the 
party's national presidential convention. In the Tashjian 
case, Marshall quoted from the Democratic Party case, saying: 
. . the freedom to join together in furtherance of common
political beliefs 'necessarily presupposes the freedom to
15identify the people who constitute the association.'" The 
statute was invalidated by the court in Democratic Party.
arguing that the party members have the right to hold the
16primary free from the influence of nonmembers. Again, we 
find the associational rights of the party prevailing in 
such type 2 challenges.
10
Guttman draws some conclusions from the court's
treatment of both type 1 and type 2 cases. She states that
the two types in conjunction: " . . .  demonstrate that
members of a political party have rights based in freedom
of association which independent voters lack. This theory
of associational rights explains why only political party
members, not independent voters, have a right to vote in a
17primary election.
Now we can turn to the type 3 case in which a 
political party challenges a state-mandated closed primary. 
The Tashjian case clearly fits into this category. Without 
even reading the specifics of the Court's opinion, one could 
deduce from the framework we have explored, that the Court 
would find in favor of the party unless there were some com­
pelling state interest. It would seem that the party's 
power to define the boundaries of its membership is part of 
the freedom of association. However, as stated earlier, 
these rights do not exist in a vacuum. The state may have 
certain interests which may control and allow for some degree 
of reasonable infringement of the party's rights. So, in 
Tashjian, the nature of the alleged infringement must be 
determined.
The statute in question barred all previously unaf­
filiated voters from participating in the primary unless they 
went through a formal process of enrollment in the party of 
their choice by no later than noon on the last business day
11
preceding the primary election. The Republican Party of 
Connecticut's state executive committee had adopted a party 
rule which sought to allow unaffiliated voters to vote in 
their primary. In other words, any independent voter could 
walk into the primary of the Republican Party, vote in the 
primary, and leave the polls still retaining his public 
status as an independent.
The Court: considered the extent of the state's 
limitation and the nature of participation in a primary 
election. Marshall wrote that within a party, members 
play many diverse roles with varying degrees of dedication 
and that: "the act of formal enrollment or public affilia­
tion with the Party is merely one element in the continuum 
of participation in Party affairs, and need not be in any 
sense the most important. Indeed, acts of public affilia­
tion may subject the members of political organizations to
18public hostility or discrimination." So, by forcing 
interested voters to enroll in the party publicly and 
formally, the state may be interfering unduly in internal 
party affairs and thus, be violating the party's rights.
The degree of this potential violation must be ascer­
tained. Some state stipulations may merely inconvenience a 
voter while others may entirely disenfranchise a voter by 
effect. Two cases from 1973 are helpful in illustrating 
this point. In Kusper v. Pontikes. 441 U.S. 51 (1973), an 
Illinois statute which barred a voter from voting in a
12
party's primary if he had voted in another party's election 
within the last 23 months was struck down. Since this 
statute: " . . .  locked voters into preexisting part affili­
ations for almost two years. . . . "  the Court found that it
19was a substantial infringement. On the other hand, in
Rosario v. Rockefeller. 410 U.S. 752 (1973), the court upheld
a New York statute which provided that to vote in the primary
a voter must have enrolled in the party by the 30th day
before the preceding general election in November. In
Rosario, the court claimed that this operated as a mere
limit on the voter's time to enroll and did not actually
20disenfranchise the voter. While these two cases may sug­
gest a litmus-paper test for all such voting limitations, in 
practice, they serve merely as possible guides, depending on 
many other factual circumstances. Unfortunately, we are 
left with no purely black and white areas to indicate what 
is a substantial infringement and what acts as a mere 
inconvenience. While they are not hard and fast rules,
Kusper and Rosario warrant consideration in order to illus­
trate more concretely how the court's balancing theory 
actually works. The next logical question is how the party's 
end of the balance weighs in importance. In other words, is 
defining the primary electorate an internal party function, 
or a legitimate exercise in state regulation?
Since the primary election, as Guttman notes: " . . .
serves as a mechanism to determine the shared political ideals
13
of party adherents by nominating those candidates that best
express acceptable views on a wide range of issues, . . . "
voting in a primary may be considered participating in a
basic function of the party. Noting that Connecticut
required the public act of formal declaration of partisan
affiliation, Marshall went on in his opinion to find the
state's infringement of the Party's freedom of association
22to be substantial.
In Tashiian, the Court held that section 9-431 
infringed on the Republican Party's freedom of association 
in three ways:
(1) by interfering with the party's right to determine 
its own membership and structure; (2) by interfering 
with and thus altering the party's message; and (3) 
by interfering with the group's ability to engage in 
effective political association.
The next logical step is to look at the other side of the
scale and see if there were protected state interests at
the heart of the statute. The Court turned to this issue
in the second main part of its opinion.
B. Arguments for interests of the state in defense of 
section 9-431
Generally, primary laws are meant to provide repre­
sentative elections which are free from unfair practices. 
One of the most criticized practices discussed with regard 
to primaries is raiding. Raiding undermines the integrity 
of the election. The state has an interest in keeping 
elections fair and clean. In Tashiian. the state advanced
14
the defense that through section 9-431, it was serving a 
compelling interest by: "ensuring the administratibility
of the primary system, preventing raiding, avoiding voter 
confusion, and protecting the two-party system and the 
responsibility of party government."' The Court examined 
each of these defenses. The general balancing test was 
that: " . . .  if the statute in question imposes a sub­
stantial burden on an individual's [or collective body of 
individuals'] right to association, the statute will be 
upheld only if it advances a compelling state interest and 
if it does so in the least restrictive manner.
The first line of defense offered by the state was 
that the implementation of the Party rule would require 
more ballots, potentially more forms, more voting machines, 
etc. It all added up to greater cost. The Court rejected 
this defense, arguing that it was not a compelling interest 
in this factual situation.
The second defense offered by Connecticut was that 
the statute prevents raiding by ill-meaning partisan oppo­
nents. The Court recognized that, in general, this is a 
legitimate interest. However, as Marshall wrote: " . . .
that interest is not implicated here. . . . "  He noted that 
raiding has not been a substantial problem in Connecticut 
and that the adoption of the Party rule would not make 
raiding by members of the opposing party any more probable 
than the original statute w o u l d . The party rule would
15
only allow voters who have been unaffiliated for at least 
the last six months prior to the primary to vote. The Court 
majority held that the state's purported interest in pre­
venting raiding does not control in this case.
The third defense was that the statute: ". . .
27avoids voter confusion. The core of this argument was 
that by allowing independents into the decision-making 
function, the resultant nominations would not be truly 
Republican nominations. Voters may be fooled by a party 
label when the candidate may really be supported more by 
independents than Republicans. Again, the majority denied 
this defense and likened it to a claim that the state was 
trying to protect the party from itself. The Court noted 
some advantages of the party rule in giving the party feed­
back as to who would be a more successful, electable candi- 
date by allowing independents to participate. Marshall 
quoted from Anderson v. Celebrerze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), 
in the Tashiian opinion: "The State's legitimate interests
in preventing voter confusion and providing for educated 
and responsible voter decisions in no respect make it 
necessary to burden the [Party's] rights. 460 U.S., at 
789"29
The final defense of the state was that Connecticut 
had a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of 
the two-party system and the responsibility of party gov­
ernment. The state attempted to demonstrate that the chosen
16
closed primary system which Connecticut adopted in 1955 best 
serves these interests. However, the party could just as 
well argue that by selecting a more open primary system, the 
party is actually strengthening the two-party system by
discouraging ”. . .  factionalism by forging a broader coali-
30tion of interests within a single political party.** Here, 
the Court noted that it was not up to the Court to issue a 
definitive judgment on the merits of open versus closed 
primaries. In a footnote, Marshall identifies the various 
primary systems prevalent in the fifty states and concludes 
that no one system could be correct for every state at all
times. He thus prudently '*. . . refused to enter the debate
31about whether open or closed primaries are better." The
majority notes also that the: " . . .  statute is defended
on the ground that it protects the integrity of the Party
32against the Party itself."
The majority concludes this second part of the 
opinion by holding that the state's interests are not com­
pelling in this case and that the First Amendment rights of 
the Party have been violated. It should be noted though, 
that buried in a footnote, the Court gives itself a dis­
claimer, saying that: "Our holding today does not establish
that state regulation or primary voting qualifications may 
never withstand challenge by a political party or its mem­
bership."33
17
After the foregoing analysis, one can venture some
generalizations regarding other type 3 challenges to a state-
mandated closed primary by a political party. The party
argues that the state has violated its ”. . .  right of
association by warping the determination of a party's shared 
34beliefs.” In the Tashjian case, the court made very clear 
that: "absent a compelling interest, a state may not inter­
fere with the associational rights enjoyed by the parties
35and their adherents.” We are much closer now to answering 
the question of whether the right to define the group of 
party adherents who may participate in a primary election 
belongs to the state or the parties. Absent a state's com­
pelling interest and if the state's definition would sub­
stantially burden the parties, the parties have this right.
Guttman has summarized this: "Thus, deference to
the political party's ability to define its own boundaries 
forms an appropriate cornerstone for the law of state 
regulation of participation in primary elections, as that
36ability goes to the very heart of freedom of association." 
Malcolm E. Jewel clearly stated the conclusions we may draw 
from the Tashjian case:
(1) states are not required to enact open primary 
laws; (2) it is only independently enrolled voters 
who may have the opportunity to vote in a partisan 
primary; (3) this opportunity will only occur if a 
political party chooses to permit the independents 
to participate. 7
18
C. Does the Party Rule implicate the Qualifications Clause?
As stated earlier, the third section of the majority 
opinion in the Tashjian case dealt with the issue of whether 
or not the party rule would implicate: ". . . the Qualifi­
cations Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, section 2, 
cl. 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment because it would estab­
lish qualifications for voting in congressional elections 
which differ from the voting qualifications in the elections 
for the more numerous house of the state legislature."
While this issue is a major one, it is less relevant to the 
analysis and framework of the states' election codes on 
which we are focusing. Therefore, a brief summary of this 
section will suffice.
The majority concluded that the Clause does apply 
to primaries in general. However, the Court found that 
perfect symmetry of voter qualifications in state and fed­
eral elections is not required and therefore, the Clause is 
not violated by the implementation of the party rule.
The Court's conclusion for the entire decision is: 
"We conclude that section 9-431 impermissibly burdens the 
rights of the Party and its members protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The interests asserted by 
appellant in defense of the statute are unsubstantial."^
0. A Note on the Dissents
There are two dissenting opinions to the Tashjian 
case. The first, written by Stevens, with whom Scalia
19
joined, dealt with a contradictory view of the Qualifica­
tions Clause issue and is thus not an appropriate subject 
for analysis here. Scalia wrote a second dissenting 
opinion, joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor. His dissent 
argued that the majority had overemphasized the party's 
freedom of association in its balancing test. Scalia 
viewed the state's rules as a reasonable regulation in a 
least restrictive manner: "The ability of the members of
the Republican Party to select their own candidates . . . 
unquestionably implicates an associational freedom— but it
can hardly be thought that that freedom is unconstitutionally
40impaired here." Obviously, Scalia viewed these state 
restrictions as a mere inconvenience to the voters and the 
party. This dissent highlights the shades of grey which 
the court attempts to define in making such decisions.
III. FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS OF THE STATES'
CURRENT PRIMARY SYSTEMS
Now that the Tashjian case has been considered, the 
next step is to survey the other 49 states' election codes. 
Many of the points discussed by the court in the Tashjian 
case reemerge in this survey. The various primary systems 
can be classified and subdivided into categories which enable 
them to be compared with Connecticut's system. After 
exploring the nature of the states' primary systems, the 
ramifications of the Tashjian case can be discussed and a
20
diagnosis of the other states' primary systems which may be 
ripe for a similar challenge may be advanced.
Before the individual state systems are discussed, 
it may be useful to offer an overriding framework and 
explore the rationale for this chosen framework. Also, a 
few words about the origin and background of these primary 
systems are in order.
As mentioned 'arlier, the direct primary was advanced 
by the progressives around the turn of the century as an 
alternative to the strong party machine's informal method of 
candidate selection. The first statewide primary law was 
introduced by Robert La Follette in Wisconsin in 1902. The 
other states soon followed suit with Connecticut, inter­
estingly enough, being the last to adopt the direct primary
41in 1955. The primary was an attempt to formalize the
internal party candidate nomination process and open it to
all party members instead of only the bosses and cadres.
Through decades of hindsight, political observers have
recognized a few bare generalizations on the effects of the
direct primary. An obvious effect was the weakening of the
42parties' power bases. Because of both the primary and 
other influences, our parties today are not the unified 
power dealers they were one hundred years ago.
Conclusions about the voters who participate in 
primaries can also be drawn. In America, compared to other 
western developed countries, there is a relatively small
21
percentage of eligible voters who actually turn out to vote
at general elections. At primaries, this percentage is even
smaller. Frank Sorauf has concluded: "All evidence points
overwhelmingly to one cardinal fact about the voting
behavior of the American electorate at primaries: it does
43not vote." This is a bit extreme, but the point is well- 
taken. The few voters who do turn out at primaries are 
generally more interested in current events and/or are 
more devoted to a particular party, cause, or candidate than 
most. The result is that primary voters are at more extreme 
ends of the political spectrum on certain issues. Thus, 
more extreme candidates who may not be electable at the 
general election may be nominated. This was one reason why 
the Republican Party of Connecticut sought to include inde­
pendents in their primary in the Tashlian case.
Since the number of voters who turn out for the 
primary is generally low, one may ask why voter eligibility 
in primaries is such a pressing issue. One answer is that 
regardless of how many voters choose to exercise this 
right, it is still protected. Another reason is advanced 
by Sorauf:
Even though the nomination does not formally settle 
the electoral outcome, its importance is great. The 
major screening of candidates takes place at the 
nomination; the choice is reduced to two in most 
constituencies. Especially in areas of one-party .. 
domination, the real choice is made at the primary. 4
The primary has become a significant element in our elec­
toral politics and warrants our attention.
22
Primaries exist in many varied forms throughout the 
country. Generally, political scientists offer a tripartite 
breakdown of types of primaries: closed, open, and blanket.
In closed primaries, only enrolled (meaning formally affili­
ated party members) party members may vote in that party's 
primary. In the generic open primary, anyone may vote in a 
partisan primary. Some states recognize the act of voting 
in a partisan primary as being an actual act of affiliation 
while other states make no conclusions from a voter request­
ing a partisan ballot. In blanket primaries, each voter 
automatically receives a ballot on which all candidates of 
every party are listed. The voter need not confine his 
voting to the candidates of only one party. These cate­
gories become rather fluid in actual practice. On the 
statute books a primary system may appear to be closed, but 
usually there are certain loopholes and catches that subtly 
influence the functioning of the system in practice. Sorauf 
explains: "The distinctions between open and closed pri­
maries are easy to exaggerate. Too simple a distinction 
ignores the range of nuances and varieties within the closed 
primary system."*®
While carefully appreciating Sorauf's critique of 
simplistic primary classifications, I have strived to note 
both the blatant and the subtle forms of exclusion and 
inclusion in the primary election statutes of the fifty 
states. I have found a framework which fits the various
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forms of primaries approximately well and which is workable. 
This framework takes the three generic classes of closed, 
open, and blanket as a general superstructure but breaks 
them down further to try and account for some important dif­
ferences within a category. It is nearly impossible to take 
into account every subtle nuance with such a macro-level 
analysis, so I do not claim this framework as the definitive 
structure for all primary systems. However, it has proven 
to be a workable and logical framework to aid an analysis of 
our primary systems. Because I have attempted to take cer­
tain important, yet subtle distinctions into account, my 
framework differs somewhat from the usual classification 
offered by other political scientists and the court. For
instance, I include 27 states in the category of closed
47primaries while Sorauf includes 38 states.
I offer a framework that may be conceptualised as
follows:
CLOSED-* ~
TYPES OF PRIMARY SYSTEMS
*+ ** *** ^ OPEN' "''"'BLANKET
(27 states) (19 states) (4 states)
Certain distinguishing characteristics involved in 
classifying these statutes arose through my research. Impor­
tant questions# such as whether the voter had to publicly 
declare affiliation, simply request a partisan ballot in
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public, or was given all ballots and voted the preferred 
ballot in secret. Also, the difference between ballot types 
became important. Another interest was to compare the 
latest date a voter could change partisan affiliation or 
enroll for the first time with the latest date to register 
before the primary. In other words, was a time limit a 
substantial restriction? These and other issues will be 
discussed with regard to each type of primary system in this 
framework.
A. Closed Primaries
As stated earlier, in closed primaries, only 
enrolled party members may vote in the primary of that party. 
Some general characteristics include separate, distinctively 
colored ballots and separate polling locations for each 
party. As with every election, the voter must first and 
foremost be a registered voter. Voting the partisan ballot 
is generally viewed as a partisan act, indicating a public 
display of affiliation to some degree. There are basically 
three forms of closed primaries: (1) the traditional closed?
(2) the modified closed? and (3) the party rule closed. One 
may conceptualize a continuum with the traditional closed 
being more restrictive (in terms of voter eligibility), the 
modified closed as being less restrictive, and the party 
rule closed falling anywhere on the continuum, depending on 
certain particular circumstances.
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1. Traditional Closed Parimaries
In these fifteen states, only enrolled party members 
may vote in the party's primary. Usually, these members 
are subject to some measure of allegiance, whether it be an 
oath of support or a record of past affiliation. When a 
new voter registers to vote, he is asked to indicate his 
partisan affiliation on the form. Some states stipulate a 
definition of partisan affiliation. In Nebraska, for 
instance, the voter must " . . .  generally support the candi­
dates of the party with which he affiliates" (Nebraska, 
section 32-515). Pennsylvania offers a more concrete defi­
nition. The statute indicates that the voter must have 
voted for a majority of the candidates of that party at the 
last general election at which he voted (Penn., Title 25- 
292).
Another way the states may limit or expand partici­
pation is by specifying a date which is the latest date a 
voter may either change their partisan affiliation or enter 
a partisan affiliation for the first time. It is also useful 
to compare this time limit with the time which the registra­
tion books must be closed just prior to any election. For 
instance, a New Mexico statute provides that the registra­
tion books be closed on the 28th day preceding any election 
(NM s 1-4-8). Usually, changes to the registration record 
may be entered at any time that the books are open. How­
ever, the fifteen traditional closed primary states make a
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distinction for changes in partisan affiliation. New 
Mexico, at the most restrictive end of the continuum, speci­
fies that if a voter wishes to change partisan affiliation, 
he must do so by the last Monday in January (which is 
approximately 4 months before the primary) (NM 1-8-11,
1-8-12). Arizona allows for any changes in registration, 
including partisan affiliation changes, during the general 
period that the registration books were open, which is up 
to the 50th day preceding the election (Arizona s 16-102, 
17-121). Thus, Arizona, along with five other of these 
traditional closed primary states, treats all changes to 
registration equally. The least restrictive statute among 
the fifteen traditional closed primary systems is South 
Dakota's. South Dakota treats all changes to registration 
and all new registrants equally, allowing anyone to register 
or make changes up to the 15th d^y preceding the election 
(SD, s 12-45, 14-4-16).
To sum up, all these traditional closed primary states 
only allow enrolled party members to participate in tlie 
party primaries. Some states offer a definition of affili­
ation which potential affiliates must meet and some offer 
no guideline. By manipulating a time frame for new regis­
tration and changes in registration, states can more subtly 
restrict or open up their particular adaptation of the 
traditional closed primary.
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While this continuum is generally correct, it should 
not be treated as a static structure. It should be fluid 
enough to take account of various forms of restrictiveness.
TRADITIONAL CLOSED
(most restrictive)*----------------------♦►(least restrictive)
New Mexico 
Kentucky 
Delaware 
Nebraska 
Maryland 
Oklahoma 
New York 
Nevada 
Arizona
Florida, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
California
Oregon
South Dakota
2. Modified Closed Primaries
The second form of the closed primary possesses many 
of the same general characteristics of all closed primary 
systems such as separate ballots for each party and formal, 
public affiliation with a party in order to vote in that 
party's primary. However, this group of eight states allows 
previously unaffiliated, independent voters to affiliate 
publicly with the party on the day of the primary at the 
polls. It is very important to note that when the previously 
unaffiliated voter walks out of the polls on the day of the 
primary, he has become a formally enrolled party member. The 
state may prescribe an enrollment form to be filled out
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before the independent votes, an oath to be taken in support 
of the party, or may simply interpret the very act of par­
ticipating in that party's primary as an act of formal 
affiliation. Thus, all regular affiliated voters (as in a 
traditional closed primary) are entitled to vote, but in 
addition, so are any independent voters who affiliate 
formally and publicly with the party at the polls.
However, a measure which identifies degrees of 
restrictiveness among these eight states emerges. While 
all previously unaffiliated voters may become eligible to 
vote in a partisan primary, there may be a definition of how 
long a voter must have been officially recognized as an 
independent. For instance, if a voter registered to vote 
for the first time in 1984 and indicated affiliation with 
the Democratic Party and in December 1986 formally changed 
his status to "independent," can he be eligible to vote in 
the Republican primary in February 1988? Also, if the same 
voter, in February 1987 enrolls in the Republican party, is 
this change within the permissible period? Again, the 
utilization of a time frame for registration and changes in 
affiliation may operate to restrict or enhance voters' 
chances for participation.
These states can be arranged on a continuum with 
regard to such time restrictions. Maine provides that an 
independent voter must have been registered as such by at 
least three months prior to the election (Maine, s 21A-141,
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21A-14<i). ikev. se, a voter wishing to change his affilia­
tion from Republican to Democrat must do so at least three 
months before the primary in order to be eligible to vote 
in Democratic primary. On the other end is Iowa, which 
stipulates that such changes must occur by the 10th day 
preceding the primary (Iowa, s 43.41).
In sum, the hallmark and distinguishing factor of 
modified closed primaries is that while still restricting 
party crossover by the opposing party, they allow previously 
unaffiliated voters to participate in the partisan primary 
by declaring affiliation with said party at the polls.
MODIFIED CLOSED
(most restrictive)<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>(least restrictive) 
Maine
Rhode Island
New Jersey
Colorado
Wyoming
Massachusetts
Kansas
Iowa
Before putting too much faith in such comfortably 
clearcut continuum schema, we must note that these continuums 
are arranged with regard to the other states in the same sub­
category. Thus, if one attempted to fit the two separate 
continuums of traditional closed and modified closed primaries 
together from end to end, they would not perfectly flush.
To illustrate, recall the case of South Dakota, the least
30
restrictive of the traditional clos-d primaries. South 
Dakota permits all voters who were enrolled in the party o y  
the 15th day prior to the primary to participate in the 
primary. Therefore, it is possible for a Democrat to switch 
affiliation to Republican on the 16th day before the primary 
and be eligible to vote in the Republican primary. The last 
date for an independent to enroll in a party and, likewise, 
become eligible to vote in a primary is also the 15th day 
preceding the primary. Compared to Maine, our most restric­
tive of the modified closed primaries, which stipulates a 
three month deadline for party affiliation changes between 
parties, but allows independents (who have remained so for 
at least the last 3 months) to affiliate at the polls.
There are too many variables and degrees to easily rank 
Maine with South Dakota. There are different characteristics 
operating in the two systems. Maine's system is definitely 
more restrictive to voters who switch affiliation between 
parties but less restrictive to independents who have 
remained so for the past three months.
I highlight these two states to illustrate that 
these continuums are somewhat separate. Generally, South 
Dakota's traditional closed continuum, as a whole, is more 
restrictive than Maine's modified closed continuum. One 
should keep this concept in mind when working with this 
framework.
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Therefore, I offer this framework as a general strue- 
ture. The significant contributions this structure puts 
forth are the subdivisions of both open and closed primaries 
and the general characteristics of these varied forms. The 
arrangement of each state on any continuum is subject to 
fluctuation and involves a judgment of subtle degree. Such 
an ordering is meant to highlight examples to reinforce the 
general characteristics of that class and to point out the 
differences which exist within each class.
3. Party Rule Primaries
These four states generally are classified as closed 
primaries because only enrolled members are permitted to 
vote. However, these states1 statutes give power to the 
parties* state executive committees to adopt party rules 
which would permit previously unaffiliated voters to par­
ticipate in that party’s primary. If the party does not 
wish to include unaffiliated voters, it remains a traditional 
closed primary system for that party. Otherwise, it would 
appear to be a form of modified closed. The post-Tashjian 
Connecticut statute falls into this party rule category.
A distinguishing factor among these party rule states 
is whether the included independent voter actually leaves 
the polls as an independent. In other words, is the inde­
pendent voter allowed to participate without having that 
participation being equated with affiliation? Hew Hampshire's 
system provides that any previously unaffiliated voters who
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choose to participate in a partisan primary lose their 
independent status. Thus, this sounds like a form of modi­
fied closed primary (NH s 654:34). South Carolina, North 
Carolina, and Connecticut's new primary systems do not equate 
the act of voting in a partisan primary by an independent 
with an act of affiliation. Therefore, the independents 
retain their unaffiliated status.
These party rule closed systems also have time frames 
which alter their effects. It is important to note how 
these states treat a change in affiliation between parties 
versus a new declaration of affiliation by an independent 
or new registrant. New Hampshire allows any changes of 
affiliation to be made up to the day before the primary, 
but independents can affiliate at the polls (NH, 654:34). 
Connecticut's revised statutes allow an independent voter 
to participate in a primary (assuming adoption of such a 
party rule) as long as that voter has been formally regis­
tered as an independent for the past six months (Conn., s 
9-59). South Carolina has a 30 day limit and North Carolina 
has a 21 day limit for changes to partisan enrollment (S.C. 
7-5-150) (N.C. 163-74 (b)). Thus, Connecticut's North 
Carolina's, and South Carolina's primary systems (assuming 
adoption of the party rule) would appear to be more like a 
modified closed and may even resemble certain types of open 
primaries.
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PARTY RULE CLOSED 
(4 states)
(voting=affil) (voting not equal to affil)
(most (least
restrictive)*----►restrictive)
New Hampshire Connecticut North Carolina
South Carolina
B. Open Primaries
Generally, open primaries are marked by the fact 
that any and all voters may be eligible to participate in a 
partisan primary. Some open primaries even disregard 
voters* records of past affiliation. When any voter walks 
into the polls# the voter may vote on any party ballot he 
wishes. It must be noted that the voter is still limited to 
voting for the candidates of only one party. The voter must 
simply choose which party*s primary he wishes to participate 
in.
There are nineteen states which fall into some kind 
of such an open primary. I subdivide the generic open 
category into three sections in order to best illustrate the 
three major forme of the open primary and their distinguish­
ing characteristics. Again, the overriding element of all 
open primaries is that all voters, whether they were once 
party members or independents, are generally treated equally 
in their likelihood of receiving a party ballot. Most of 
these states don*t even include a section on partisan
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affiliation on their registration documents. The three 
forms of the open primary are: (1) public affiliation open;
(2) public request open; and (3) extreme open.
1. Public Affiliation Open
This group of six primary systems, which are placed 
at the more restrictive end of the open primary continuum, 
are often classified by observers as closed. They exist in 
a borderline area, but becciuse of what I feel are significant 
distinctions, I confidently place them in this most restric­
tive subdivision of the open primary.
The distinguishing characteristic of the public 
affiliation open primary system is that the act of voting in 
the primary of a certain party is equated with affiliation 
with that party. By voting the distinctive ballot of a 
party, one declares formal affiliation and enrollment in that 
party. Some states utilize a familiar time schedule which 
limits voters' ability to switch parties, but when it comes 
down to the basic affiliation definition, all voters really 
have equal footing to gain a ballot. For instance, Ohio, 
which I place at the most restrictive end of this public 
affiliation open continuum, sets up a framework whereby a 
voter who presents himself to vote at a party's primary must, 
if challenged, state that he: " . . .  desires to be affili­
ated with and supports the principles of the party" (Ohio, 
s 3513.19). Ohio puts forth a more strict definition of 
eligibility to vote in a party's primary, but the oath the
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voter must swear -y denotes current, not past or future, 
affiliation. Oth r states, such as Indiana, stipulate that 
the voter must have voted for a majority of the party's 
nominees at the last preceding general election in which 
he voted but leaves the requirement rather unenforceable 
(Indiana, 3-1-9-3). Texas requires that the voter must not 
have voted in another party's primary in that year (Texas, 
s 162.012).
Regardless of the statutes' definition n f affilia­
tion, all six states allow any voter, in actual operation, 
to vote in either party's primary. The distinguishing 
feature of this public affiliation open primary is that, by 
voting in said primary, the voter publicly declares affili­
ation with that party. Many commentators have placed thene 
states in a closed primary category because of the fact that 
public affiliation is required. However, the fluidity of 
affiliation from election to election is the countervailing 
characteristic which puts these states into any form of an 
open primary.
PUBLIC AFFILIATION OPEN
(some definition (no definition of
of allegiance) allegiance other
than voting)
Ohio Indiana Texas Alabama
Arkansas
Tennessee
2. Public Request Open
In this second form of an open primary, all voters, 
completely regardless of past affiliation, past voting 
record, or even current partisan support, are eligible to 
participate in the partisan primary of their choice. No 
affiliation is deduced from the mere act of voting in the 
primary of a party. In these five states, voters simply 
walk in and request a certain party's ballot. Voters are 
limited to voting for only the candidates of one party.
While the voter must formally and publicly request the 
ballot of one party, the voter is not officially recognized 
by such behavior as actually affiliating with that party. 
Usually, there is no record kept of which ballot the voter 
requested. Often, the polling ;laces for each party are at 
the same location.
Mississippi provides a useful example. The statute 
does indicate that: "No person shall be eligible to partici
pate in any primary election unless he intends to support 
the nominations made in the primary in which he participates 
(Miss. 23-15-575). However, when it comes down to enforce­
ment, section 23-15-571 states that no voter may be chal­
lenged on the grounds of partisan affiliation. A ranking 
among these five states would be misleading at best, thus I 
will not attempt to set up a continuum to compare these 
states with sach other.
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PUBLIC REQUEST OPEN 
(in alphabetical order)
Hawaii
Illinois
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
3. Extreme Open Primary
In this form of the open primary, there is no public 
announcement of preference, support, or affiliation with any 
party. The polling place for each party is usually located 
at the same place in each precinct. All voters receive a 
ballot package which contains all the parties' ballots in 
it. The voter is limited to participating in only one of 
these parties' primaries, but this choice, which ballot 
section to mark, is made in private.
The usual scenario utilizes a ballot with sep- 
aratible columns for each party's ballot. The voter uses 
the party column of his choice and no one else knows of his 
preference. Each portion of the main ballot is of the same 
size and color. North Dakota provides a "Consolidated 
Primary Election Ballot" which has columns for each party's 
candidates and statesi "You may vote for the candidates of 
only one party at the primary election" (N. Dakota, s 16.1- 
11-22). As with the states of the public request open cate­
gory, these states cannot easily be reduced to a ranking.
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EXTREME OPEN 
(in alphabetical order)
Idaho
Minnesota
Montana
North Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin
C. Blanket Primaries
The last major category of primaries is the blanket 
primary. This system, often called the non-partisan primary 
system, has been adopted by four states. The distinguishing 
characteristic of this category is that it seems, by its 
nature, to be more of a state-sponsored poll of the general 
public than an internal partisan nomination process.
In a blanket primary, any voter may participate.
There is but one polling place in each precinct and but one 
ballot form. However, as Guttman explains: " . . .  the
voter may distribute his votes among the various parties
40just as he may in a general election.” Anyone may vote for 
any combination of partisan candidates. The voter is not 
limited to determining the nominees of only one party. There 
is absolutely no form of partisan affiliation or preference 
shown. Because of its no-strings-attached demeanor, Sorauf 
reminds us that it has been termed the "free love” primary.** 
These blanket primaries are fundamentally different processes 
than the open or closed categories because of the ability of 
the voters to impact all the parties involved. The ballot
CLOSED PRIMARIES 
Traditional Cloned 
lodified Cloned 
•arty tale Cloned 1
OPED PRIMARIES 
•ublic Affiliation Open 
Ilk leanest Open <
trene Ofn
I M D  HMttlES
is organized by office, not party, listing 1 1  candidates 
for each office in similar groups.
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BLANKET PRIMARIES 
(in alphabetical order)
Alaska
Louisiana
Virginia
Washington
The overall framework I have presented may be loosely 
viewed on the aggregate level as a continuum, with the most 
restrictive forms to the left and the least restrictive forms 
to the right.
PRIMARIES
CLOSED * OPEN A BLANKET
(27 states) A (19 states) A (4 states)
Traditional Modified 
Closed Closed
Party A Public 
Rule A Affll. 
Closed A Open
Public Extreme A 
Request Open A 
Open
Consult the map included for a geographic representation of 
the state primary schema.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TASHJIAN V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF 
CONNECTICUT
Through analysing the Tashiian case, certain quali­
ties of Connecticut's former primary scheme were held to 
violate the party's freedom of association in the absence of 
a compelling state interest. Now we can recognise
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Connecticut's pre-Tashiian primary system as a traditional 
closed primary. Only enrolled party members were eligible 
to vote in the primary. Independents could enroll in the 
party as the day before the election, but voters wishing 
to switch affiliation from one party to another had to do 
so at least six months prior to the primary if they wished 
to vote in it. With regard to the restrictiveneas to 
affiliation switchers, this would put Connecticut to the 
far left, the most restrictive of all traditional closed 
primaries. However, with regard to the limitations on 
independent voters, Connecticut's prc-Taahlian primary 
structure would fall to the far right, that is, the least 
restrictive, of the traditional closed primary states.
Again, we notice the differences of trying to account for a 
multiplicity of characteristics at once with a continuum 
method. If one interpreted the Court's decision as a 
reflection on the particular set of statutes, then one would 
be forced to conclude that the Court, in its Tashiian 
opinion, has issued a terminal sentence and given the last 
rites to all traditional closed primary systems, thus inval­
idating at least IS states' primary election systems.
However, this is a simplistic conclusion. Mist must 
be remembered is the Court's rationale, not merely the 
result of the contest. The Court's decision hinged upon two 
major pointst (1 ) that the party was claiming interference 
in its internal functions and thus, a violation of its
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collective right of freedom of association; and (2) that the 
state exhibited no compelling interests in defense of the 
statute. I believe that Tashilan has ramifications for some 
states' current primary systems, but I reject the oversim­
plification that the court has pronounced judgment on the 
closed primary as a class.
Malcolm E. Jewell succinctly reviews some results of 
the Tashjian case for Connecticut: "(1) states are not
required to enact open primary laws; (2) it is only inde­
pendently enrolled voters who may have an opportunity to 
vote in a partisan primary; (3 ) this opportuntiy will occur
only if a political party chooses to permit the independents
50to participate." The result of the Court decision, i.e. 
the adoption of the party rule, indicated that in this case, 
a modified closed primary or party rule closed primary would 
be constitutional.
From this evidence, one may venture a prediction 
that all traditional closed primary systems would be under 
fire after this case. However, this is not so. Many other 
factors will influence the outcome of a challenge to any of 
these 15 traditional closed primary statutes.
The diagnosis that I offer requires consideration 
for the type of primary system, the intent of parties to 
include previously unaffiliated voters, the interests of 
the state, and the type of challenge advanced. Earlier, 
Guttman's conceptual framework of the three types of
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challenges to state election codes fostered a methodological 
analysis of the Court's reasoning in the Tashiian case.
Now, that framework, in addition to the survey and classi­
fication of the fifth states' election codes, permits an 
educated diagnosis of statutes that are ripe for a challenge.
When an independent voter challenges a state-mandated
closed primary (traditional or modified) without the party's
support, that challenge will usually fail because of the
party's associational right to exclude. In a challenge by
a political party of a state-mandated open primary (of the
public affiliation open, public request open, or extreme
open forms) the party's associational right will usually
prevail. Similarly, when a political party challenges a
state-mandated closed primary, as in Tashiian, the political
party can argue» " . . .  that the state has violated the
party's right of association by warping the determination
51of a party's shared beliefs." Keeping in mind the nature 
of the infringement and the interests of the state, it is 
possible for this challenge to succeed. The court generally 
delegates the right to define its membership boundaries to 
the party when the party and the state disagree and if the 
party's definition does not implicate -ther constitutional 
issues.
Judging from the confusing ranking of Connecticut's 
pre-Tashlian election code, it is difficult to pin down a 
similar statute, that, under r'milar conditions, would be
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stru own. My conclusion is that all states in the tra­
dition.. ’osed and the modified closed categories possess 
the potential for a challenge by a party similar to the 
challenge in Tashiian.
However, that conclusion presupposes that the parties 
involved would pursue a challenge to include independents 
in their primary electorate. 1 hypothesize that in some 
of these states with a large proportion of independent 
voters, some parties may challenge their state's closed 
primary systems.
Therefore, my proposed diagnosis is that approxi­
mately six states' primary systems, from both the tradi­
tional and modified closed categories, may be ripe for a 
constitutional challenge, given the right political con­
siderations. From the traditional closed category, only
New York has a high (roughly 17%) percentage of independent 
52voters. If the intent existed, I believe that New York's 
primary system may be susceptible to attack by a major state 
political party, absent a compelling interest of the state. 
The five states from the modified closed category, Colorado, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, and Massachusetts, which has proportions 
of Independents above one-third, would be susceptible to a 
similar attack.
In conclusion, The Tashiian case does not implicate 
the closed primary system per se. It implicates certain 
examples of the closed primary system where the exercise of
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such a system substantially interferes with the party's 
associational right without a compelling state interest. It 
is also a possible conclusion, that aspects of certain forms 
of open primary systems could come under attack as a result 
of the Court's reasoning in Tashiian.
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SOURCE STATUTES
A. CLOSED
1. Traditional Closed
Arizona Revised Statutes 1984 (sections 16-102, 
-121, -467)
West's Annotated California Codes 1974 (Supp 
1988) (sections 305, 501, 502)
Delaware Code Annotated 1981 (Supp 1986)
(Title 15, -3110, -3161, -1749)
Florida Statutes Annotated 1982 (Supp 1987) 
(98.051, 101.021)
Kentucky Revised Statutes 1982 (116.055, 116.045)
Annotated Code of Maryland 1986 (Art. 33, 
sect. 3-8)
Revised Statutes of Nebraska 1984 (32-350, -476, 
-515, -216)
Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated 1986 (293.257, 
.287)
New Mexico Statutes 1985 (Supp 1987) (1-4-16, 
1-4-8, 1-8-12)
New York Election Law 1978 (Supp 1988) (1-104.9, 
5-210, 5-300)
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 1976 (Title 26,1-104, 93.40, 93.49)Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated 1986 (254.365, 247.025, 201.290)Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated 1963 (Supp 1987) (Title 25, 291, 292, 299, 951-28, 623-17, 623-30)South Dakota Codified Laws 1982 (Supp 1987)(Title 12, 6-1, 6-26, 4-5, 4-16)Nest Virginia Code 1987 (3-1-35, 3-2-30)
2. Modified ClosedColorado Revised Statutes 1980 (Supp 1987) (1-2-205, 1-2-202)Kansas Statutes Annotated 1986 (Supp 1967) (25-3301, -2311, -3304)Iowa Code 1973 (Supp 1187) (43.42, 43.44, 43.41)Maine Revised Statutes Annotated 1987 (Title 21A, 141, 143, 144)Annotated Laws of Massaohusetts 1976 (Supp 1987) (S3137# 53i38, 51«26)New Jersey Statutes Annotated 1964 (Supp 1997) (19123-45, 19(31-6.1)Rhode Island Qeneral Laws 1981 (Sump 1967) (17-9-26, 17-15-2, 17-9-3, 17-9-27)Wyoaing statutes Annotated 1987 (Title 22,5-212, 5-214)
51
3. Party Rule Closed
Connecticut General Statutes Annotated 1967 
(Supp 1988) (Ti.9, -431, -374, -56, -59)
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 1986 
(Supp 1987) (654s34, 654:32)
North Carolina General Statutes 1987 (163.74, .59, 
.150)
South Carolina Code 1977 (Supp 1987) (7-9-20, 
7-5-150)
B. OPEN
1. Public Affiliation Open
Alabama Code 1977 (Supp 1986) (17-16-14)
Arkansas Statutes Annotated 1976 (Supp 1985) 
(3-126, 3-102)
Georgia Code Annotated 1980 (Supp 1987) (3-4-902)
Indiana Code 1976 (Supp 1986) (3-1-9-3)
Ohio Revised Code Annotated 1988 (3515.19, 
3503.02, 3513.05, 3503.14)
Tennessee Code Annotated 1985 (Supp 1987) 
(2-7-115)
Texas Codes Annotated 1986 (Supp 1988) (162.001, 
162.003, 162.012)
2. Public Request Open
Hawaii Revised Statutes 1985 (Supp 1987) (12-31)
Illinois Revised Statutes 1984 (Supp 1986)(7-43)Michigan Compiled Lews Annotated 1967 (Supp 1987)
Mississippi Code Annotated 1972 (Supp 1987) (23-15-575)Missouri Annotated Statutes 1980 (Supp 1988) (115.397)
3. Traditional OpenIdaho Code 1991 (Supp 199?) (34-402, 34-404, 34-904)Minnesota Statutes Annotated 1982 (Supp 1988) (204D.08)Montana Code Annotated 1983 (13-10-301,13-10-309)North Dakota Century Code 1981 (Supp 1997) 18.1-11-22)Utah Code Annotated 1994 (Supp 199?) (20-3-19)Vermont Statutes Annotated 1992 (Supp 198?)(Title 17, 2363, 2382)Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 1998 (Sunp 1987) (1.37, 4.80)
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C. BLANKET
Alaska Statutes Annotated 1977 (Supp 1986) 
(15.05.010, 15.25.090, 15.25.060) 
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated 1976 
(Supp 1988) (18»401B, 18i52lB)
Virginia Code 1985 (Supp 1988) (24.1-182) 
Washington Revised Code 1965 (Supp 1988) 
(29.18.200)
